Industries · Agriculture → Food processing & safety systems

Nothing stops the line. Not ransomware, not us.

Processing runs on OT and food-safety control systems, where an hour of downtime is real money and a safety failure is more than a data problem. We find the path ransomware would take onto the plant floor and close it, testing with uptime and safety as hard limits.

The problem

What food processing & safety systems is up against.

01

Ransomware on OT

The IT intrusion that crosses into the plant and halts production.

The problem

Ransomware on OT

Ransomware rarely starts on the plant floor. It starts in a corporate inbox, then finds the flat path to the systems that run the line. On OT, encryption isn’t the worst case: a halted line, spoiled product, and a safety system that trips are. We follow the route from the first foothold to the floor and show you where to cut it.

  • Corporate foothold, then the path to the floor
  • Flat IT/OT paths ransomware rides
  • Where to break the chain before the line stops
Ransomware readiness →
02

Food-safety control systems

Control systems where a security failure becomes a safety one.

The problem

Food-safety control systems

Temperature, dosing, sterilisation, and the interlocks behind them run on controllers a security failure can reach. When a cyber problem becomes a food-safety problem, it’s not a data breach any more, it’s recalled product and a public health question. We test those systems the way they have to be tested: carefully, with safety as a hard limit.

  • Controllers behind temperature and dosing
  • Safety interlocks a compromise could reach
  • Tested with safety as a hard constraint
OT-aware testing →
03

Remote & vendor access

The remote access integrators and OEMs keep into plant control systems.

The problem

Remote & vendor access

Line builders and control-system vendors keep standing remote access for support, straight into the OT that runs the plant. It’s rarely scoped or watched, and one compromised vendor account is a path onto the floor that skips the corporate network entirely. We find those doors before someone else uses them.

  • Integrator and OEM standing remote access
  • Vendor paths that skip corporate IT
  • Shared support credentials into OT
Third-party risk →
04

Suppliers & integrators

The processors, packagers, and software partners whose compromise becomes yours.

The problem

Suppliers & integrators

A plant depends on a web of suppliers and integrators, and most firms “assure” them with a questionnaire. A returned spreadsheet and a SOC 2 badge aren’t the same as someone actually trying to break in. When you need the real answer, we map the connections and the blast radius if a partner is breached.

  • Questionnaire evidence isn’t a test
  • The connections partners actually hold
  • Blast radius when a supplier is breached
Supply-chain risk →
05

The cost of a stopped line

Downtime costs money by the hour, so a careless test is as bad as the attack.

The problem

The cost of a stopped line

A processing line loses money every hour it’s down and spoils product it can’t get back. A test that trips a line is a failure, not a finding. We work passive-first, with uptime and safety as hard limits, and put a hands-on operator wherever automation shouldn’t be trusted near the floor.

  • Downtime and spoilage by the hour
  • Passive-first, uptime as a hard limit
  • Operators near anything that can trip
Humans in the loop →
06

Generic testing misses OT

IT-style testing treats plant OT like an office network and misses how it really fails.

The problem

Generic testing misses OT

A scanner pointed at a PLC either tells you nothing or knocks it over. Plant OT breaks differently from an office, and a template test sails past the few things a real attacker would reach for first. We scope to your plant, your controls, and your safety constraints, and leave the checklist at the door.

  • OT fails differently from office IT
  • Scanner-and-report misses the real paths
  • Scoped to your plant and its constraints
How we test →
How an attacker gets in

How an attacker gets in

There’s never just one way in. A real engagement maps the routes from a corporate foothold across the IT/OT boundary to the controllers that run the line. Stall one path and an attacker loops back and tries another.

EntryFootholdPivotEscalateObjectivePhishingcorporate inboxRemote accessVPN · portalIntegrator accessOEM supportStolen credscredential dumpCorporate ITflat · trustedEngineering hostHMI workstationData historianIT/OT bridgeIT/OT boundaryflat crossingSCADA networkplant controlPLCsline controllersSafety systemsinterlocks · SISLine haltedproduction stopsFood-safety controltemp · dosingthe route taken this runother possible routesloop back to go again

What you get: a ranked shortlist of the fixes that cut the most routes to the line and the food-safety systems first, so remediation spend buys real risk reduced.

Read the ICS meat-production engagement →
Regulation by regulation

The rules you answer to, and how we test for each.

Food-safety regulation and critical-infrastructure reporting both apply. We test to them with safety and uptime as constraints, and rehearse the response so the first run isn’t during the incident.

StandardWhat it expectsHow we test it
FSMA
Food-safety controls and, for covered facilities, defense against intentional adulteration (IA rule).
We test whether a cyber intrusion could reach the control systems those food-safety measures depend on.
CIRCIA
Report significant incidents within 72 hours and ransom payments within 24, as covered critical infrastructure.
We rehearse the detection-to-report path so the first run isn’t during the incident.
IEC 62443
Zones, conduits, and security levels across plant automation and control systems.
We test the IT/OT boundary meant to keep an intrusion off the line.
Compliance & risk alignment →
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