The line runs. Every shift, uninterrupted.
On the plant floor, downtime is a safety problem before it is a security one. The job: the line runs and the shift ends normally, because the paths from IT to OT were tested and closed first.
Full shift, full output. Downtime: none.
Three lines, twenty-four hours. Testing found the IT-to-PLC route someone would have taken and closed it before it reached the floor.
What industrial & manufacturing is up against.
Hover or select any one to see what it means.
Uptime comes first
A scan that nudges a PLC the wrong way can stall a line or fault a controller. Availability is the whole point of the plant.
IT/OT convergence
Once an attacker is on the business network, a flat or poorly segmented design lets them walk straight to the controllers.
Ransomware on OT
Ransomware on IT doesn’t have to touch a PLC to stop the plant. Encrypt the engineering workstations and historian and production halts anyway.
Legacy, unpatchable OT
Much of the install base predates modern security and runs for decades more. You often can’t patch it, reboot it on demand, or rip it out.
When a breach turns physical
When the security failure is a safety instrumented system, the blast radius isn’t data. It’s pressure, temperature, and people.
Every route ends at the same place: the systems that move the physical world.
What you get: every path from IT to the floor, mapped and ranked, tested with care for systems that cannot simply be taken down.
Ransomware readiness →Testing that respects the floor.
Automated where safe, operator-led where the plant demands it. Never a blind scan at a PLC.
Plant-floor testing with uptime and safety as hard constraints: passive first, automated only where safe, operator-led where it isn’t.
Explore →A full path from a phished corporate laptop to the controllers, proving whether your IT/OT boundary actually stops an attacker.
Explore →Tests whether ransomware on IT can reach or halt production, and whether your isolation and recovery survive a real incident.
Explore →Builds and exercises the OT incident response and CIRCIA reporting muscle before an outage forces you to improvise.
Explore →The bar the standards set, and how we test to it.
The frameworks set the floor. The real bar is whether an IT compromise can reach the machines.
Covered incidents and ransom payments reported to CISA on the clock.
We test the routes that would start that clock, so you close them first.
OT security engineering: segmentation, access control, monitoring.
We test whether an IT compromise can actually reach the controllers.
Zones, conduits and security levels across the automation lifecycle.
We test the conduits the way an attacker would cross them.
line stoppages while we tested the ICS live.
A purple team ran offense live alongside the defenders at a meat producer. Segmentation gaps found, lateral movement to the ICS closed off.
Read the ICS study →