It’s all connected. So every breach is yours.
Your business runs on a web of software, vendors, tools and updates, all wired together and all trusted. Compromise any one of them and the breach flows straight through to you. You did nothing wrong, and you’re still exposed.
Not sure this is the one? Find your fix →supply-chain attackany one of these is a way in
Not hypothetical. A few of the real ones:
- 2025Jaguar Land Rover
A breach halted production for weeks and cascaded through the supplier network: an estimated £1.9bn hit and 100,000+ jobs at risk.
- 2025npm — chalk + debug
A phished maintainer let attackers ship malicious versions of 18 packages, 2bn+ weekly downloads, to hijack crypto transactions in the browser.
- 2023MOVEit
Cl0p mass-exploited a zero-day in MOVEit file-transfer software, stealing data from thousands of organisations.
- 2020SolarWinds
A backdoor in Orion updates reached up to ~18,000 organisations, including US federal agencies.
- core-runtime2.4.1✓
- http-client1.9.0✓
- img: base-os22.04✓
- xml-parser3.1.2!
- vendor-agent5.0!
- crypto-lib0.8.7✓
You know what you’re running.
We review your dependencies, direct and transitive, your base images, and the commercial and vendor software inside your walls. The known-vulnerable, the outdated, and the tampered all surface before an attacker uses them.
You know what one breach reaches.
Blast-radius analysis maps what a single poisoned package or vendor binary would actually touch: the systems, data and privileges at stake. You contain the paths that matter instead of chasing every CVE.
Your build can’t be turned against you.
We test the CI/CD, signing and build path where one tampered step spreads everywhere. That closes the dependency-confusion and malicious-package gaps a vulnerability feed will never surface.
Trace the dependency to its blast radius.
Incenter tracks the dependencies and images you ship and the software you run at machine speed, flagging known-vulnerable and drifted components with every build.
See the platform →Operators dig into the build pipeline, signing, and the malicious-package and tampered-software risk a feed of CVEs never surfaces on its own.
Meet the team →We take the software supply chain apart. Our team’s own research into Python’s packaging ecosystem:
Vulnerability ResearchPip Dreams and Security Schemes, Part II: The Interpreter in the Machine