Industries · Financial services → Banking

Testing that goes past the exam to the threats a bank actually faces.

Examiners check that controls exist. We check whether they’d actually stop someone: core banking, the channels your customers touch, and the privileged access an insider could abuse.

Map your banking risk →All of financial services →
The problem

What banking is up against.

01

Channel & payment fraud

Online and mobile banking, the APIs behind them, and the payment rails an attacker moves money through.

The problem

Channel & payment fraud

Nobody’s cracking your encryption. They don’t need to. Fraud lives in the boring places: a transfer flow that trusts the wrong field, a step-up prompt that can be skipped, a reconciliation job that won’t notice until month-end. We follow the money the way a fraudster does, through the seams, rather than working control-by-control down a checklist.

  • Business-logic flaws in payment and transfer flows
  • Weak step-up and transaction authentication
  • Reconciliation and limit gaps fraud hides in
Application & API security →
02

Privileged & insider access

The standing access to ledgers and customer data that a compromised account inherits.

The problem

Privileged & insider access

A bank runs on standing access to ledgers, core, and customer data, most of it never scoped down, revoked, or watched. One phished employee or one over-permissioned service account inherits the lot. The question was never whether that access exists; it’s how far it travels once someone holds it. We find out before they do.

  • Over-scoped admin and service accounts
  • Reused credentials and weak separation of duties
  • Standing access a single phish inherits
Red team engagements →
03

Core & third-party exposure

Core platforms and the fintech and processor integrations that extend your perimeter.

The problem

Core & third-party exposure

Your perimeter quietly moved into other people’s data centers — the processor clearing your card traffic, the fintech bolted onto the core, the SaaS a business unit signed up for last year. Each was vetted with a questionnaire, and the answers were assembled the afternoon before they were due. A signed attestation says a vendor can describe a control. It says nothing about whether that control holds when someone leans on it. We map the live connections and what an attacker reaches through each if the provider falls.

  • Questionnaire “evidence” written the afternoon it’s due
  • An attestation describes a control; it doesn’t survive an attack
  • What a breached processor opens onto your core
Third-party risk →
04

Stretched budgets

Security spend rarely keeps pace with the threat, so every dollar has to map to real risk reduced.

The problem

Stretched budgets

Threats compound, regulations multiply, and the budget gets a polite single-digit bump. “Spend more” isn’t a strategy. The work is tying every dollar to risk actually reduced, retiring what’s just coasting, and walking into the board meeting able to show the difference rather than a bigger invoice.

  • Threats and rules rise every year
  • Spend and headcount rarely keep pace
  • Every dollar tied to risk reduced
Improving ROI →
05

Tool sprawl

Too many tools from too many vendors, each delivering unevenly, so spend keeps climbing without the protection following.

The problem

Tool sprawl

A bank accumulates security tools the way it accumulates everything else — by acquisition, by audit finding, by whichever vendor the last CISO trusted. What’s left is two products that both claim to do endpoint detection, a SIEM nobody has retuned since it was installed, and licenses for modules that were never switched on. The capability a vendor is pitching this quarter is often a tab you already pay for. We start by testing what’s deployed, and tell you which of it actually stops something.

  • Tools inherited from mergers and audit cycles
  • Overlapping products nobody has tuned
  • Capability you already own, switched off
Spend nothing →
06

One size doesn’t fit all

Off-the-shelf, checklist testing misses how your specific stack and controls actually fail.

The problem

One size doesn’t fit all

Checklist testing assumes every bank breaks the same way, in the same order, off the same template. Yours doesn’t. A scanner run and a generic report will tick the box and sail straight past the few things in your stack a real attacker would reach for first. We scope to your environment, your controls, your threat model, and leave the template at the door.

  • Checklist tests assume everyone fails alike
  • Your stack and controls are specific
  • Scoped to your real threat model
How we test →

How an attacker gets in

There’s never just one way in. A real engagement maps many entry points and the paths they open. When one route stalls, an attacker loops back, escalates, and tries another. Most paths still converge on the same objectives.

EntryFootholdPivotEscalateObjectivePhishingstaff inboxRemote accessVPN · CitrixPayment processorvendor accessStolen credscredential dumpOnline bankingpublic-facingBranch networklobby WiFiTeller endpointbranch hostCorporate networkflat · trustedE-banking DMZperimeter hostLateral movementhost to hostCloud / M365tokens · OAuthDomain adminActive DirectoryService accountspayment · SWIFTSWIFT / wiresmove moneyCore bankingledgers · PIIthe route taken this runother possible routesloop back to go again

What you get: a ranked shortlist of the fixes that close the most routes to your assets first, so remediation spend buys real risk reduction and the next attacker hits a dead end.

Read the bank engagement →
How we help

Here’s how we help banking.

The work that fits your stack, your threats, and the regulators you answer to.

Penetration testing

Test the channels, APIs, and core the way an attacker would.

Explore →
Red team engagements

Prove the whole chain. One major bank engagement started from a visitor-network jack.

Explore →
Compliance & risk alignment

A test that satisfies the examiner and would stop the attacker.

Explore →
Incenter, continuous

Keep coverage current between exams.

Explore →
Regulation by regulation

The rules you answer to, and how we test for each.

Examiners and DORA expect tested resilience. We run engagements built for these regimes, and Incenter keeps coverage current between exams.

StandardWhat it expectsHow we test it
FFIEC
Independent testing of controls, including penetration testing, proportional to risk (IT Examination Handbook).
External and internal pen testing across core, channels, and segmentation.
PCI-DSS
Internal and external penetration testing at least annually and after significant change, plus segmentation testing (Req 11).
Scoped testing of the cardholder data environment, with proof the segmentation holds.
GLBA
Regular testing or monitoring of the effectiveness of safeguards (Safeguards Rule).
Testing that shows the safeguards actually work, not just that they exist.
DORA
Regular resilience testing, and threat-led penetration testing for significant entities (Art 24–27).
Intelligence-led red teaming modelled on TLPT / TIBER.
SOC 2
Vulnerabilities detected and remediated; auditors expect real testing (CC7.1).
Penetration testing that satisfies the SOC 2 auditor and finds what matters.
Compliance & risk alignment →
More in financial services

Built for banking. Tested for attackers.

Talk to us
Talk to us
A specialist who knows the banking threat model and the regime around it.
Continuous platform
See Incenter
Continuous testing across your whole surface, kept current between audits.